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Geo-economics: Russia and Iran in Syria 
 
Faysal Itani 
 
This article examines two dimensions of a broader analysis of 
the geo-economics of reconstruction in Syria: the actions of Iran 
and Russia in the context of their interests and capabilities. The 
analysis identifies overlaps and conflicts among these interests 
and examines the larger geo-economic and geo-political impli-
cations. A comprehensive survey of Iranian and Russian in-
volvement in Syria’s economy is difficult given the scarcity of 
reliable data, but this section captures the essential geoeconomic 
trends involving these two key actors.  
 
 
The Geo-economics of Russian Involvement 
 
A Brief History of Russia in Syria 
In October 2015, Russia entered the Syrian civil war to reverse 
the regime’s deteriorating security situation and ensure its long-
term survival. More broadly, Russia sought to preserve its stra-
tegic posture in the Middle East and end a perceived Western 
regime change campaign. Russia ultimately seeks to translate its 
military gains into a political settlement that would legitimize its 
role and allow it to draw down its military efforts. Russia has 
secured some economic interests in Syria but the profit motive 
appears subordinated to strategic ones, and Russia lacks the 
means or appetite to fund Syria’s reconstruction on a meaningful 
scale. 
The close relationship between Russia and Syria dates back 
to at least the mid-20th century. The USSR had maintained close 
ties with Baathist-led Syria from the 1960s and supported it 
through at least two confrontations with Israel. Soviet arms ex-
ports to Syria reached $825 million1 in 1977, $1 billion in 1978 
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and an average of $2.3 billion per year until 1985. In sum, the 
USSR supplied some $25 billion of military equipment to Syria 
and trained some 10,000 Syrian officers.  
Prior to the civil war, Russia was heavily involved in key 
sectors of the Syrian economy. Political stability and security al-
lowed Russia to pursue profits. Russian companies were im-
portant investors in the oil and gas extraction industries 
throughout the 2000s (the civil war has made this sector far less 
productive and lucrative). Russian investments in infrastructure 
and energy totalled $20 billion in 2008. The Russian energy con-
glomerate Tatneft entered the Syrian market in 2010 by devel-
oping in South Kishamnear Deir-ez-Zor, which is believed to 
contain 4.9 million tons of oil. Soyuzneftegaz, which signed a 
phosphate-mining deal for a site, made investments in energy as 
well. The civil war jeopardized those investment prospects. So-
yuzneftegaz eventually terminated its deal in 2015, and Tatneft 
has suspended its project. 
Yet even before the war, strategic considerations factored 
into the Russian economic calculus in Syria. In addition to 
providing military aid and fiscal support, Russia has forgiven 
Syria’s debt multiple times. In 2005, Russia absolved Syria of 
75 percent, or $14 billion of outstanding debt.  
 
Russian Geo-economics in the Civil War 
Russia is being granted a preferential role in rebuilding Syria’s 
energy and infrastructure sectors. Preferential access to hydro-
carbons reserves is just as valuable for the geopolitical leverage 
they provide in a political settlement and indeed in post-war 
Syria. In 2015, the executive director for the Russia Union of Oil 
and Gas Producers, Gissa Gutchel, announced that Russian busi-
nesses would quickly fulfill contracts and resume operations in 
this sector totalling $1.6 billion once the situation in Syria had 
stabilized. On March 2018, Russia’s Energy Minister Alexander 
Novak signed a cooperation agreement with his Syrian counter-
part on oil and gas production. It “implies the participation of 
Russian companies in Syrian projects, and the negotiations are 
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conducted on a regular basis,” said Victor Khaikov, president of 
Russia’s National Association of Oil and Gas Service. Khaikob 
highlighted Russian participation would be profitable as well. 
For its part, the Syrian regime is energetically wooing Rus-
sian investment in energy. In February 2016, a Syrian repre-
sentative travelled to Moscow to meet with the Minister of 
Energy and the heads of the petroleum industry and requested 
that Russian oil and gas companies help restore Syria’s de-
stroyed energy sector. Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Walid 
Muallem stated Syria would allow “all possible incentives” to 
companies participating in the reconstruction. In July 2017, the 
Syrian government offered 25 percent of profits from oil and gas 
fields captured from the Islamic State to Evro Polis, a Russian 
military contractor allegedly owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a 
Russian businessman close to President Vladimir Putin. 
During the war the Syrian government has signed several 
large military contracts with Russia; a pro-Russian newspaper 
reported that the two countries signed a $550 million deal in De-
cember 2011 for the delivery of 36 Yakovlev Yak-130 Mitten 
combat trainers. The active parts of the arms contracts had, in 
2012, an estimated value of $4.5 billion. Between 75 and 90 per-
cent of new arms purchased by Syria in this period were Russian-
made. That year, one quarter of the weapons produced in Russia 
between 2005 and 2009 were exported to Syria. 
In its drive to de-escalate its own military efforts, Russia is 
likely to prioritize the reconstruction of state security services 
and army institutions. This simultaneously boosts the legitimacy 
of its ally the regime, helps the latter impose and enforce local 
settlements that preserve regime sovereignty, and eases the op-
erational burden on the Russian military. Indeed a political 
agreement with the opposition is acceptable or even desirable for 
Russia insofar as it recognizes regime superiority, but that de-
pends on the regime retaining indefinite military superiority 
given its continued unpopularity among much of the population. 
Because rebuilding core infrastructure is of strategic im-
portance to the regime, it is a likely target of Russian support. 
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Russia’s entry into the Syrian civil war was accompanied by a 
simultaneous commitment to assisting in certain infrastructure 
projects. Russian objectives have included regaining access to 
key roads and linking this infrastructure. Pro-Russian media out-
let Russia Today reported that Syrian Prime Minister Wael al-
Khalqi stated, “The Russian side has responded to the idea of 
restoring [Syrian] infrastructure. Therefore, a lot of deals were 
signed, including $675 million and $280 million agreements.” In 
2017, Russia signed a forty-nine year lease in Tartus to upgrade 
a serviceable naval base near the coastal city. Allegedly, plans 
for Russian forces to further expand infrastructure in Tartus and 
Hmeimim are underway.  
In February 2018, the Russia Chamber of Commerce held a 
Russia-Syria business forum to discuss opportunities with Syria 
at a time when the war seems to be going in the regime’s favor. 
At the forum, the Syrian-Russian Business Council claimed to 
have “established contact,” and that a number of unspecified 
contracts have already been implemented. The Syrian govern-
ment attended and sought Russian investment in twenty-six pro-
jects. These included a planned rail line linking the Syrian 
capital to its airport, industrial plants producing a range of out-
puts from cement to yeast and tyres, and power generation pro-
jects in Homs. In any case, the Russian Chamber of Commerce’s 
President made clear that “first priority will, as President Bashar 
al-Assad has said, be given to Russian businesses.” 
Russia printed currency to support the Syrian government 
in 2012, initially to pay off the Syrian state’s growing budget 
amid its initiative to create state jobs and maintain subsidies dur-
ing the civil war. Russia has also assisted in stabilizing govern-
ment revenues. According to the Jamestown Foundation, “Under 
Russian Ministry of Finance supervision, the production of cur-
rency [...] went through a logistic chain of both Syrian and Rus-
sian cargo carriers that transported over 200 tons of currency in 
a ten-week period to the Syrian government with a continuous 
flow of currency as needed to prop up the Syrian economy.” 
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Implications 
Despite fiscal support, promised investments, and close rela-
tions, it would be incorrect to assess Russian geoeconomic ac-
tivity (current and prospective) as ‘reconstruction’ in the 
development sense. Russia lacks the financial means to shoulder 
a substantial portion of the hundreds of billions of dollars in es-
timated reconstruction costs. More importantly it does not prior-
itize ‘rebuilding’ Syria but rather ensuring regime survival, 
gaining geopolitical leverage, and exploiting certain lucrative 
and/or strategic sectors. Reconstruction would offer geopolitical 
leverage of course, but Russia can generate leverage through 
diplomatic and military action.  
When it comes to reconstruction as development, Russia 
aims to shift the financial burden to Europe and international 
agencies. In turn, it will likely hold out the promise to facilitate 
the return of hundreds of thousands of (Muslim) Syrian refugees. 
While this would benefit the West and generate international 
goodwill or at least respect for Russian influence, the Syrian 
government has a say in this and may be less eager to reabsorb 
millions of potentially hostile and certainly needy people. The 
most likely trajectory of Russia involvement amid Syria’s isola-
tion will therefore be targeted investment that secures some of 
its commercial and strategic interests and preserves core regime 
military capabilities to the degree possible.   
Russia shares with Iran the focus on securing regime sur-
vival. So long as that hung in the balance (2011-2016) this con-
vergence of interests was enough to keep differences at bay. As 
the regime’s military situation has stabilized however, the ques-
tion of what ought to follow highlights some differences be-
tween Russia and Iran over geoeconomic priorities and 
strategies.  
 
 
The Geo-economics of Iranian Involvement 
 
A Brief History of Iran in Syria 
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The Iranian-Syrian strategic relationship dates back to the rule 
of Hafez Assad in the 1970s, based in large part on shared hos-
tility toward Israel and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Under Bashar 
Assad, this relationship deepened in opposition to the United 
States and Saudi Arabia and support for the Lebanese militia 
Hezbollah. Bilateral trade between Iran and Syria reached its 
peak in 2010 at $545 million, with Syrian exports to Iran ac-
counting for 30 percent of the figure.  
Despite this, Iran’s core interests in Syria are largely secu-
rity-focused. Iran entered the Syrian civil war to preserve Hez-
bollah’s strategic posture vis a vis Israel. Iran calculated that 
Bashar Assad’s fall would threaten supply lines to and the stra-
tegic depth of Hezbollah, as Iran expected a hostile, Sunni-led 
regime to replace it. More broadly, Iran did not want a Sunni-
led, Saudi or US-aligned Syria to emerge in the Levant. 
Iran entered the civil war in its early stages, largely in a mil-
itary advisory capacity and by building up and deploying proxies 
against rebel forces. It too sought to ensure the regime’s survival, 
but for historical reasons the Iranians’ institutional relationship 
with the regime was less comfortable than Russia’s, and its 
standing in Sunni Arab Syrian society is complicated by its Per-
sian and radical Shia character. Yet because the Iranian regime 
relied largely on local Syrian (and Lebanese) proxies to fight and 
control territory, it developed an entrenched military and in-
creasingly social presence on the ground. Iran’s involvement is 
therefore simultaneously more intimate and more alien than Rus-
sia’s. 
 
Iranian Geo-economics in the Syrian Civil War 
Iranian geo-economic strategy is shaped by two factors: military 
priorities relating to the security of Hezbollah and the posture 
against Israel; and political-economy considerations favoring 
the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The former 
will require securing sensitive land and transport rights or direct 
control, shaping Iran’s economic choices. Meanwhile the IRGC 
will likely be the main beneficiaries of many Iranian activities, 
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and is likely to crowd out competition from the Iranian private 
sector or civilian institutions. Despite its deeper military in-
volvement and presence however, an increasingly-isolated Iran 
is at an economic disadvantage to Russia and China with their 
superior resources and closer integration into the global econ-
omy. Still, its crucial important to the regime war effort has 
granted it multiple economic opportunities. 
Iran and Syria signed a series of agreements that were an-
nounced throughout 2017, including opportunities for Iran to ob-
tain and build a mobile service network. The IRGC owns much 
of Iran’s telecoms sector after it bought 50 percent-plus-one 
share in the state telecoms company in 2009. In September 2017, 
Iran announced it will build power plants in the coastal province 
of Latakia with a capacity of 540 megawatts. In a separate mem-
orandum, Iran also committed to a project to reconstruct a 90-
megawatt plant in Deir Ezzor. In the same agreement, five gas-
fired power plants will be moved to Syria’s northwestern city of 
Aleppo; the Mapna Group, an Iranian enterprise with possible 
IRGC ties, will implement the 130-million-euro project.  
While these agreements granted Iran large economic con-
tracts in Syrian telecommunications, electricity, and phosphate 
mining sectors, other sectors including real estate are also in-
volved. Syria plans to give Iran 5,000 hectares of land for farm-
ing and 1,000 hectares for setting up oil and gas terminals, 
according to Iran’s state news agency IRNA. At a news confer-
ence in early 2018, a senior official of Iran’s Research Center of 
Petroleum Industry revealed that Iran and Venezuela would con-
struct oil refineries in Syria, an investment worth approximately 
$1 billion. Again, the main beneficiary of this project would be 
the IRGC.  
On August 2018, Iranian economic delegation headed by 
Iran’s Deputy Minister of Roads and Urban Development Amir 
Amini visited Damascus for talks on a long-term economic part-
nership agreement between the two countries. The details have 
not been disclosed. Director of the ministry’s International Af-
fairs department Teymour Bashir Gonbadi has stated Iranian 
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companies will be involved in reconstructing Syria’s transporta-
tion infrastructure and building 30,000 homes in the country. 
Gondadi also Iran plans to establish a railway connection be-
tween Iran and Syria via Iraq, saying that now is an opportune 
time, given China’s desire to secure railroad access to the Med-
iterranean within the framework of its Belt & Road Initiative 
(BRI). 
One particularly contentious activity has been Iran’s acqui-
sition of Syrian land for strategic and religious purposes. Iranian 
media has confirmed the purchases of land in parts of Syria. The 
purchases are reported to be in the Sayyida Zaynab suburb of 
Damascus, where a prominent Shia shrine exists, and the Old 
Town of Damascus, although the latter report is less clear. The 
head of the Iranian Department of Reconstruction of Holy 
Shrines has quoted saying, “the urban planning of the area near 
Sayyeda Zaynab is to be revised. A new model is being prepared 
now and we are buying the properties around the shrine.” Un-
confirmed reports have circulated around Iranian land purchases 
in the Mazzeh district around the Iranian Embassy, in the Bahsa 
area near the Iranian Cultural Centre, and areas in the strategic 
city of Homs. 
Separate from any civilian or commercial efforts, Iran re-
portedly is building a permanent military base 8 miles south of 
Damascus. Satellite images commissioned by the BBC seem to 
show construction activity at the site between January and Octo-
ber of 2017. Analysts believe that these efforts showcase Iran’s 
willingness to fill gaps in regime security, in a geography that is 
of critical importance to Iran and Hezbollah. This is obviously 
not reconstruction but still a reflection of Iranian resource-allo-
cation and therefore priorities.  
 
 
The Larger Picture 
Iranian and Russian interests align over the Syrian regime’s se-
curity, but diverge over post-war Syria’s character and place in 
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the international order. Russia seeks to consolidate and interna-
tionally legitimize the post-war order so as to draw down its mil-
itary and attract foreign funding and reconstruction, securing the 
regime’s long-term future. Iran seeks to entrench itself militarily 
against Israel with little regard for international repercussions - 
a goal that is at odds if not completely incompatible with reinte-
grating the regime into the global order and attracting recon-
struction funding. Even as Iran establishes a more robust anti-
Israel posture in Syria and enriches the most important player in 
its political economy, the IRGC, Russia projects the message 
that the Syrian conflict is over and normalization is on offer, in 
exchange for international development funds and support. 
There is a tension in both countries’ geo-economic strategy: 
the IRGC’s commercial interests are at odds with the heightened 
risk of large-scale conflict with Israel in Syria (the result of 
Iran’s continuing military buildup in Syrian territory). Any Is-
raeli-Iranian war in Syria is likely to further set the Syrian regime 
back economically, along with any IRGC economic opportuni-
ties. Russia’s geo-economic challenge is to revitalize an econ-
omy in territory governed by an international pariah state and an 
isolated foreign government. It is perhaps Russia that has the 
more ambitious and therefore more difficult task. 
 
